Slide 1
A 3D deep dive into the India-China borderBy Nathan Ruser and Baani Grewal
ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre has built 3D satellite imagery— through the collection and analysis of new satellite imagery and using open-source datasets we have compiled (such as geolocated military & infrastructure positions) —to help assess current developments along the India–China border.
India–China border tensions have become one of the Indo-Pacific’s defining territorial disputes. Over three decades of confidence-building measures and border agreements ended in June 2020 with the deaths of Indian and Chinese soldiers in Ladakh. Despite multiple rounds of tactical and diplomatic talks in 2020–21, the military stand-off between the two Asian powers is currently at a stalemate. Before the Ladakh crisis, a 2017 stand-off between Indian and Chinese troops in Doklam highlighted the ongoing risk of an unsettled border.
The Chinese military’s activities on the contested border have been one of the key drivers behind the shift in the Indian public’s and government’s assessments of India’s relationship with China. The result has been a faster convergence in regional security and strategic policy directions. One obvious manifestation of this is the growing Quad partnership between New Delhi, Tokyo, Canberra and Washington. Events and activities on and around this contested border are important to understand, not only for regional dynamics but also because of the risk of conflict and escalation. This is phase 1 of this project, and it focuses on the Doklam region.
India–China border tensions have become one of the Indo-Pacific’s defining territorial disputes. Over three decades of confidence-building measures and border agreements ended in June 2020 with the deaths of Indian and Chinese soldiers in Ladakh. Despite multiple rounds of tactical and diplomatic talks in 2020–21, the military stand-off between the two Asian powers is currently at a stalemate. Before the Ladakh crisis, a 2017 stand-off between Indian and Chinese troops in Doklam highlighted the ongoing risk of an unsettled border.
The Chinese military’s activities on the contested border have been one of the key drivers behind the shift in the Indian public’s and government’s assessments of India’s relationship with China. The result has been a faster convergence in regional security and strategic policy directions. One obvious manifestation of this is the growing Quad partnership between New Delhi, Tokyo, Canberra and Washington. Events and activities on and around this contested border are important to understand, not only for regional dynamics but also because of the risk of conflict and escalation. This is phase 1 of this project, and it focuses on the Doklam region.
Satellite imagery analysis shows that both India and China have continued military troop and infrastructure build-up at the border. This has accelerated following the 2017 stand-off (see our key findings here). India’s historical positions along the borderlands in the Doklam region have resulted in it maintaining a surveillance advantage throughout the area, using frontline positions abutting the border.
But China has also consolidated its position across Doklam over the past 20 years, largely constructing installations in areas that are hidden by terrain from Indian positions on the ground but are clear in satellite imagery. Significantly, some of this construction has accelerated since 2017 and includes the construction of several observation towers. More recent developments include the construction of a ‘rear road’ that stretches along 5 kilometres of treacherous and mountainous terrain and is accompanied by several military installations, including trenches, likely command posts and artillery pits. This ‘rear road’ building effort has continued across late 2020 and early 2021, but construction has slowed since 2020. The road project is significant in both its scale and its importance for facilitating PLA operations in a key part of the contested border region by helping China bridge tactical gaps overlooking crucial Indian territory (see here).
Our findings suggest that ad hoc disengagement agreements don’t change the long-term conditions or strategic and territorial imperatives for China. As the border becomes more crowded—with built-up infrastructure and thousands of Indian and Chinese positions continuing to compete for strategic territorial advantage—the risk of escalation continues to increase.
Our findings suggest that ad hoc disengagement agreements don’t change the long-term conditions or strategic and territorial imperatives for China. As the border becomes more crowded—with built-up infrastructure and thousands of Indian and Chinese positions continuing to compete for strategic territorial advantage—the risk of escalation continues to increase.
About this project & research methodology
About this project & research methodology
For this project, ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre acquired and analysed post-2017 high-resolution satellite imagery of the Doklam region. These images included strong coverage of the period from 2019 to 2021.
These images were cloud-free, although, in some areas, shadows created by terrain hindered our analysis. These images were visually analysed to search for areas of human influence and likely military positions and infrastructure, which we then marked and annotated. Archived imagery dating back to 2005 was also accessed and used to establish when developments had occurred.
Following this satellite image collection and analysis, we acquired 3D elevation data and used it to build both terrain analysis of the mapped positions and for imagery to be draped over, allowing a 3D model of the disputed area to be built.
Published on 22 September, this is phase 1 of the project and it focuses on the Doklam region. Future phases of this project will depend on our research capacity and funding support. If you would like to learn more about this project, support it, or both, please contact icpc@aspi.org.au.
Click here to see information about ASPI's International Cyber Policy Centre and the acknowledgements for this project.
These images were cloud-free, although, in some areas, shadows created by terrain hindered our analysis. These images were visually analysed to search for areas of human influence and likely military positions and infrastructure, which we then marked and annotated. Archived imagery dating back to 2005 was also accessed and used to establish when developments had occurred.
Following this satellite image collection and analysis, we acquired 3D elevation data and used it to build both terrain analysis of the mapped positions and for imagery to be draped over, allowing a 3D model of the disputed area to be built.
Published on 22 September, this is phase 1 of the project and it focuses on the Doklam region. Future phases of this project will depend on our research capacity and funding support. If you would like to learn more about this project, support it, or both, please contact icpc@aspi.org.au.
Click here to see information about ASPI's International Cyber Policy Centre and the acknowledgements for this project.
Introduction
Introduction
More than a year after Indian and Chinese soldiers clashed at the disputed border in Ladakh in June 2020—the first deadly border skirmishes in 45 years—the military stand-off between the two Asian powers has resulted in escalated tensions, despite multiple rounds of military and diplomatic talks.
The past year has seen a renewed build-up of military and transport infrastructure along the India–China border as both sides reacted to recent tensions. A new strategic reality, combined with heightened mistrust and growing Chinese assertiveness across the Indo-Pacific, has cemented the de facto India–China border as a flashpoint.
This makes India–China border tensions one of the key defining territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific and therefore deserving of more attention from and understanding by policymakers across the region. Areas of contention span the entire border, including the 2020 clash areas in Ladakh (such as Galwan Valley and Pangong-Tso), but stretch as far as Doklam near Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh.
Increased numbers of both Chinese and Indian troops have been stationed near the border over the past year. Our research has tracked some of their movements, with particular concentrations seen in the Ladakh region. This has occurred concurrently with significant infrastructure build-up in the border regions by both India and China, allowing for both quicker injections of troops to the border and greater support for those stationed there.
One of the border areas we’ve been tracking is Doklam—a strategically significant territory cushioned between India, China and Bhutan but claimed by both China and Bhutan—which provides a template for how a renewed focus on the border could provoke further conflict in an already tense relationship.
The past year has seen a renewed build-up of military and transport infrastructure along the India–China border as both sides reacted to recent tensions. A new strategic reality, combined with heightened mistrust and growing Chinese assertiveness across the Indo-Pacific, has cemented the de facto India–China border as a flashpoint.
This makes India–China border tensions one of the key defining territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific and therefore deserving of more attention from and understanding by policymakers across the region. Areas of contention span the entire border, including the 2020 clash areas in Ladakh (such as Galwan Valley and Pangong-Tso), but stretch as far as Doklam near Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh.
Increased numbers of both Chinese and Indian troops have been stationed near the border over the past year. Our research has tracked some of their movements, with particular concentrations seen in the Ladakh region. This has occurred concurrently with significant infrastructure build-up in the border regions by both India and China, allowing for both quicker injections of troops to the border and greater support for those stationed there.
One of the border areas we’ve been tracking is Doklam—a strategically significant territory cushioned between India, China and Bhutan but claimed by both China and Bhutan—which provides a template for how a renewed focus on the border could provoke further conflict in an already tense relationship.
The Doklam Region
The Doklam Region
In 2017, a military stand-off between Indian and Chinese soldiers in Doklam was considered a watershed moment for both Delhi and Beijing. India, which stated that it was acting in coordination with Bhutan, briefly entered Bhutanese territory to prevent Chinese soldiers from constructing a road that would have given Beijing a strategic overlook over crucial Indian territory.
But, after 73 days, the stand-off ended and both sides withdrew most frontline troops. Despite conflicting reports about the implementation of the 2017 disengagement agreement and increased Chinese activity bordering Doklam, the agreement was largely seen as a success at the time, leading to the belief that border de-escalation mechanisms were working and border tensions could be managed through political and diplomatic engagement (Prime Minister Modi and President Xi held two bilateral summits during 2018 and 2019).
Three years after the agreement, the 2020 Ladakh border crisis and subsequent breakdown of the bilateral relationship has increased scepticism in India regarding the success of broader political and military engagement that aimed to decrease potential escalations and settle the boundary dispute.
This has been reinforced by reports of a fresh, brief clash between Indian and Chinese troops in Sikkim in January 2021 near the site of the 2017 Doklam clash—a reminder of the continued heightened tensions and persistent risk of escalation across the entire India–China border.
But, after 73 days, the stand-off ended and both sides withdrew most frontline troops. Despite conflicting reports about the implementation of the 2017 disengagement agreement and increased Chinese activity bordering Doklam, the agreement was largely seen as a success at the time, leading to the belief that border de-escalation mechanisms were working and border tensions could be managed through political and diplomatic engagement (Prime Minister Modi and President Xi held two bilateral summits during 2018 and 2019).
Three years after the agreement, the 2020 Ladakh border crisis and subsequent breakdown of the bilateral relationship has increased scepticism in India regarding the success of broader political and military engagement that aimed to decrease potential escalations and settle the boundary dispute.
This has been reinforced by reports of a fresh, brief clash between Indian and Chinese troops in Sikkim in January 2021 near the site of the 2017 Doklam clash—a reminder of the continued heightened tensions and persistent risk of escalation across the entire India–China border.
However, more recent assessments that there was no real solution seem justified by continued developments since then. Currently, our findings show that China remains in control of nearly 50 square kilometres of internationally recognised Bhutanese territory in Doklam*, shifting the de facto tri-border junction between China, India and Bhutan around 5 kilometres to the south, and has made further claims to Bhutanese territory.
* Calculated as part of the satellite analysis performed for this project.
* Calculated as part of the satellite analysis performed for this project.
Three years later, the 2020 Ladakh border crisis and subsequent breakdown of the bilateral relationship has increased scepticism in both India and China regarding the success of disengagement agreements in reducing tensions, along with broader political and military engagement which aimed to decrease miscalculations and settle the boundary dispute.
This has been reinforced by reports of a fresh, brief clash between Indian and Chinese troops in Sikkim in January 2021 - near the site of the 2017 Doklam clash - a reminder of the continued heightened tensions and persistent risk of miscalculation across the entire India-China border.
Our key findings
Our key findings
ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre has analysed the status of Indian and Chinese military positions in Doklam. We've done this through building 3D satellite imagery, the collection and analysis of new imagery and using open-source datasets we have compiled (such as geolocated military & infrastructure positions). Our findings suggest the following:
- India and China have both continued their military infrastructure build-up along the border, including the construction of new frontline observation towers and forward troop bases. China has accelerated construction following the 2017 stand-off, and road construction continued through late 2020 and early 2021.
- In Doklam, despite the 2017 disengagement agreement, China has exploited its de facto control of Bhutanese territory, allowing its military to continue building road infrastructure, including a strategic 'rear road', towards Indian territory. There was a significant bout of construction in 2018 and 2019, following the stand-off.
- India’s historical positions along the borderlands in the Doklam region have resulted in it maintaining a surveillance advantage throughout the area by using frontline positions abutting the border. However, China has consolidated its position across Doklam over the past 20 years, largely constructing in areas hidden by terrain from Indian positions. Some of this construction has accelerated since 2017
- Currently, approximately 50 square kilometres of internationally recognised Bhutanese territory is under the de-facto control of Beijing. The Chinese military continues to construct military positions and infrastructure in this area.
- The result is a highly crowded border with built-up infrastructure and thousands of Indian and Chinese posts continuing to compete for strategic territorial advantage. This increases the risk of escalation and potential military conflict.
The Chicken’s Neck - Siliguri Corridor and Jampheri ridge
The Chicken’s Neck - Siliguri Corridor and Jampheri ridge
India considers Doklam to be a strategic vulnerability due to its unique position overlooking the Siliguri Corridor, which is a narrow patch of territory that almost separates India from Bhutan and India’s eight northeastern states, including the disputed state of Arunachal Pradesh. The Siliguri Corridor is colloquially known as the ‘Chicken’s Neck’, and at its narrowest is only a 22 kilometre-wide land bridge. The corridor also facilitates India’s connectivity to important neighbours Nepal and Bangladesh.
The hilltops in Doklam provide a direct vantage point over the entire Siliguri Corridor. In particular, the Jampheri (Zompelri) Ridge is of considerable significance for India, as it provides direct views over the entire corridor.
Mount Gipmochi (Gyemochen) is the northeastern tip of Jampheri Ridge and is the site of the key territorial dispute between India, China and Bhutan in Doklam. China claims that the border tri-juncture is at Mt Gipmochi, which would put the Doklam Plateau under Chinese control, while India believes that the tri-juncture lies north of Mt Gipmochi at Batang La, which puts the Jampheri Ridge under Bhutan’s control.
The visibility from Mt Gipmochi, darker colours show increased viewability
Site of the 2017 border standoff
Site of the 2017 border standoff
In June 2017, Chinese forces in Doklam began the construction of a road along the Indian border, southward towards Mt Gipmochi. The strategic implications of this road prompted India to take pre-emptive action. It sent troops into Bhutanese territory to prevent the construction of the road.
Chinese positions on the Jampheri Ridge would put Chinese troops in a position of oversight of the Siliguri Corridor. India believes that access to the ridge could give China an upper hand in direct military conflict, especially if China used the position to cut off access for India to its northeastern states and Bhutan by controlling the corridor.
Reports from 2017 said that India believed China wanted to construct the road towards Mt Gipmochi, while China accused India of ‘triggering’ the clash by crossing the boundary into Bhutan and attempting to change the status quo through border infrastructure improvements.
Chinese positions on the Jampheri Ridge would put Chinese troops in a position of oversight of the Siliguri Corridor. India believes that access to the ridge could give China an upper hand in direct military conflict, especially if China used the position to cut off access for India to its northeastern states and Bhutan by controlling the corridor.
Reports from 2017 said that India believed China wanted to construct the road towards Mt Gipmochi, while China accused India of ‘triggering’ the clash by crossing the boundary into Bhutan and attempting to change the status quo through border infrastructure improvements.
India's Position
India: Positions—surveillance advantage and infrastructure—since 2005
Beijing’s assertion about India’s infrastructure expansion—within Indian territory—is backed by satellite imagery. Starting from 2005, India appears to have established or improved most of its border positions, which are bolstered by pre-existing garrisons and trenches.
In comparison to India, China has fewer positions and is largely positioned back from the border, placing only small concentrations of troops and military positions at the border ridges. However, its frontline troops are supported by significant transport and barracks infrastructure, which it has significantly increased since 2017, allowing Chinese troops to quickly mobilise to the border.
Even though all Chinese positions, except for the 2017 stand-off site, were established before 2005, it’s also worth noting that China has invested in significantly improving its road network, and hence access, to the region.
In comparison to India, China has fewer positions and is largely positioned back from the border, placing only small concentrations of troops and military positions at the border ridges. However, its frontline troops are supported by significant transport and barracks infrastructure, which it has significantly increased since 2017, allowing Chinese troops to quickly mobilise to the border.
Even though all Chinese positions, except for the 2017 stand-off site, were established before 2005, it’s also worth noting that China has invested in significantly improving its road network, and hence access, to the region.
Proximity of mapped positions to the recognised Indian border
This graph shows that there is a much larger number of Indian military positions close to the internationally recognised border than there are Chinese positions.
China's Position
China: Positions—new observation towers and hidden roads—since 2017
While India maintains control over most of the ridges along the Doklam border, giving it considerable territorial and tactical advantage over most of the contested territory, China has sought to bridge that tactical gap since 2017.
Since the 2017 stand-off, China has built several observation towers on sections of the border that it maintains control over, boosting its surveillance coverage over both Indian and contested territory. China’s infrastructure push since 2017 indicates Beijing’s long-term goal of building positions of strategic importance in Doklam.
Since the 2017 stand-off, China has built several observation towers on sections of the border that it maintains control over, boosting its surveillance coverage over both Indian and contested territory. China’s infrastructure push since 2017 indicates Beijing’s long-term goal of building positions of strategic importance in Doklam.
A map of positions along the de-facto India/China border (including occupied Bhutanese territory) showing areas (circled) where Chinese positions approach the border.
One of these positions (the furthest right) is the location of the 2017 stand-off. The middle position appears to have been established in a 'gap' of Indian positions along the border and was expanded following the crackdown.
One of these positions (the furthest right) is the location of the 2017 stand-off. The middle position appears to have been established in a 'gap' of Indian positions along the border and was expanded following the crackdown.
Before/after view
One of the installations errected at China's border outpost since the 2017 stand-off includes this tall tower, visible on the left, that sits on top of a ridgeline that demarcates the Chinese and Indian border. Several of these towers have been erected in Chinese positions since the 2017 stand-off and appear aimed to give Chinese forces areas of greater visibility into Indian territory, something that the majority of Chinese positions are lacking.
This tower is also similar to other installations constructed by Chinese forces in Bhutanese territory. Click in the bottom left of the slide to see a similar tower constructed in Chinese-occupied North Bhutan.
Click in the bottom left of the page to open a slider comparing the two positions.
This tower is also similar to other installations constructed by Chinese forces in Bhutanese territory. Click in the bottom left of the slide to see a similar tower constructed in Chinese-occupied North Bhutan.
Click in the bottom left of the page to open a slider comparing the two positions.
Rear Road
China’s rear road hidden from Indian posts, leading up to Doka La
One piece of key infrastructure constructed by China in the disputed territory since 2017 is the ‘rear road’, which leads south from previous Chinese positions. The constructed road stretches along 5 kilometres of treacherous and mountainous terrain, and is accompanied by several significant military installations, including trenches, likely command posts and artillery pits (see our annotations in maroon that geolocate this infrastructure). This project is significant in both its scale and its military importance. The road points south, and is being constructed towards the Jampheri Ridge—the focus of the 2017 Doklam stand-off—and the Siliguri Corridor.
The construction of the ‘rear road’ continues a pattern we’ve observed among Chinese positions in the disputed territory, most notably that new positions and associated infrastructure developments are largely designed to be out of sight of Indian ridge-top positions, presumably to permit concealed deployments and operations.
The image to the right shows a helipad constructed following the 2017 stand-off that was dug into the hillside, providing it cover from Indian postiions on a nearby ridge.
The image to the right shows a helipad constructed following the 2017 stand-off that was dug into the hillside, providing it cover from Indian postiions on a nearby ridge.
The road is entirely constructed on the eastern-facing aspect of a ridge, and largely out of view of Indian positions. Although its construction slowed over 2020 (when its length was extended by only 400–600 metres, without reaching the ridge), it shows that on-the-ground strategic imperatives continue to drive actions despite tactical disengagement agreements that take place after border confrontations between China and India.
Before/after view
The disparity in tactical positioning between China and India is clear in the following scroll-over image, which shows the visibility from both Indian (teal) and Chinese (red) positions in the Doklam region.
Although it is not complete, Indian positions have far more visibility into Chinese-occupied Bhutan and Chinese territory than the Chinese positions have across the border into India. This dynamic dominates the tactical element of this strategic area.
Click in the bottom left of the page to open a slider comparing the two maps.
Although it is not complete, Indian positions have far more visibility into Chinese-occupied Bhutan and Chinese territory than the Chinese positions have across the border into India. This dynamic dominates the tactical element of this strategic area.
Click in the bottom left of the page to open a slider comparing the two maps.
Conclusion
Several risk-factors for future conflict remain
The disputed Doklam Plateau highlights many of the shortcomings of tactical disengagement agreements across the Line of Actual Control. While those agreements are helpful steps, reducing the likelihood of immediate conflict, they don’t address the strategic drivers of tension along the India–China border. Both China and India have shown that, while they’re willing to negotiate on tactical positions, they aren’t willing to sacrifice their broader strategic advantages or the infrastructure-backbone needed in any future outbreak of conflict.
Several observers examined the outcome of the 2017 Doklam stand-off and concluded that India’s incursion into the disputed territory China was seeking to control could provide a successful model to deter Chinese expansionism and possibly force China to reassess its goals. Continued strategic construction since then, including towards the presumed Chinese objective of the Jampheri Ridge, shows that those goals remain.
Along the border, the causes of tension haven’t yet been addressed, and several risk factors for future conflict remain. They include the physical proximity of Indian and Chinese forces, the disparity between conceptions of where the border lies and China’s growing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region. Those risk factors should be mapped in detail, and meaningful concessions by both sides must be made if either side wants to make the outbreak of conflict less likely. Should China continue to seek to change the status quo, then escalatory risks will grow.
Doklam has shown the resilience of strategic imperatives—especially for the Chinese military—despite disengagement agreements.
Several observers examined the outcome of the 2017 Doklam stand-off and concluded that India’s incursion into the disputed territory China was seeking to control could provide a successful model to deter Chinese expansionism and possibly force China to reassess its goals. Continued strategic construction since then, including towards the presumed Chinese objective of the Jampheri Ridge, shows that those goals remain.
Along the border, the causes of tension haven’t yet been addressed, and several risk factors for future conflict remain. They include the physical proximity of Indian and Chinese forces, the disparity between conceptions of where the border lies and China’s growing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region. Those risk factors should be mapped in detail, and meaningful concessions by both sides must be made if either side wants to make the outbreak of conflict less likely. Should China continue to seek to change the status quo, then escalatory risks will grow.
Doklam has shown the resilience of strategic imperatives—especially for the Chinese military—despite disengagement agreements.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Danielle Cave for all of her work on this project. Thank you also to all of those who peer-reviewed the work and provided valuable feedback that improved it, including anonymous reviewers and Fergus Hanson, Michael Shoebridge, Sushant Singh, Dr Arzan Tarapore, Manoj Kewalramani, Dr Malcolm Davis and Dr Marcus Hellyer.
ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre receives funding from a variety of sources, including sponsorship, research and project support from governments, industry and civil society. No specific funding was received to fund the production of this report. This is phase 1 of this project. Future phases will depend on our research capacity and funding support. If you would like to support or learn more about this project, please contact icpc@aspi.org.au.
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) ASPI is an independent, non-partisan think tank that produces expert and timely advice for Australian and global leaders. ASPI generates new ideas for policy makers, allowing them to make better-informed decisions. ASPI is one of the most authoritative and widely quoted contributors to public discussion of strategic policy issues in the Indo-Pacific region and a recognised and authoritative Australian voice in international discussion on strategic, national security, cyber, technology and foreign interference issues.
ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre is a leading voice in global debates on cyber, emerging and critical technologies, foreign interference and issues related to information operations and disinformation. The Centre's work is agenda setting and focuses on the impact these issues have on broader strategic policy. The Centre informs public debate globally and supports policy development in the Indo-Pacific region by producing original, empirical, data-driven research. You will find the centre’s research here. The Centre has a growing mixture of expertise and skills with teams of researchers who concentrate on policy, technical analysis, information operations and disinformation, critical and emerging technologies, cyber capacity building and Internet safety, Indigenous STEM and gender, satellite analysis, surveillance and China-related issues.
Note: Information on this website has been derived from sources reliable and accurate at the time of publication (Sept 2021). Readers should note that circumstances may change after a document is published, including as a consequence of changes to government policy or industry practice resulting from a document’s publication. The information is provided on the basis that readers are responsible for making their own assessment of the matters contained or discussed on this site.
Copyright: © The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2021
This web site is subject to copyright. Except as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part of it may in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written permission. Enquiries should be addressed to the publishers. Notwithstanding the above, educational institutions (including schools, independent colleges, universities and TAFEs) are granted permission to make copies of copyrighted works strictly for educational purposes without explicit permission from ASPI and free of charge.
ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre receives funding from a variety of sources, including sponsorship, research and project support from governments, industry and civil society. No specific funding was received to fund the production of this report. This is phase 1 of this project. Future phases will depend on our research capacity and funding support. If you would like to support or learn more about this project, please contact icpc@aspi.org.au.
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) ASPI is an independent, non-partisan think tank that produces expert and timely advice for Australian and global leaders. ASPI generates new ideas for policy makers, allowing them to make better-informed decisions. ASPI is one of the most authoritative and widely quoted contributors to public discussion of strategic policy issues in the Indo-Pacific region and a recognised and authoritative Australian voice in international discussion on strategic, national security, cyber, technology and foreign interference issues.
ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre is a leading voice in global debates on cyber, emerging and critical technologies, foreign interference and issues related to information operations and disinformation. The Centre's work is agenda setting and focuses on the impact these issues have on broader strategic policy. The Centre informs public debate globally and supports policy development in the Indo-Pacific region by producing original, empirical, data-driven research. You will find the centre’s research here. The Centre has a growing mixture of expertise and skills with teams of researchers who concentrate on policy, technical analysis, information operations and disinformation, critical and emerging technologies, cyber capacity building and Internet safety, Indigenous STEM and gender, satellite analysis, surveillance and China-related issues.
Note: Information on this website has been derived from sources reliable and accurate at the time of publication (Sept 2021). Readers should note that circumstances may change after a document is published, including as a consequence of changes to government policy or industry practice resulting from a document’s publication. The information is provided on the basis that readers are responsible for making their own assessment of the matters contained or discussed on this site.
Copyright: © The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2021
This web site is subject to copyright. Except as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part of it may in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written permission. Enquiries should be addressed to the publishers. Notwithstanding the above, educational institutions (including schools, independent colleges, universities and TAFEs) are granted permission to make copies of copyrighted works strictly for educational purposes without explicit permission from ASPI and free of charge.
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A 3D deep dive into the India-China border
About this project & research methodology
Introduction
The Doklam Region
Our key findings
Site of the 2017 border standoff
China’s rear road hidden from Indian posts, leading up to Doka La
Acknowledgements